PQ Visualizer

Guide

Dilithium vs Falcon vs SPHINCS+

Quick answer: Falcon is smallest among these three, Dilithium (ML-DSA) is a common first migration choice with the most mature finalized standard (FIPS 204) and tooling among these three today, and SPHINCS+ (SLH-DSA) is the hash-based option with the largest signatures and the most niche production use.

Comparison table

Signature size ranges use representative values from this project's dataset and referenced standards. Falcon signatures are variable-length; sizes shown are typical averages. Scope is limited to these three NIST-selected signature families.

FamilyStandardTypical signature sizeStrengthsTradeoffs
DilithiumML-DSA (FIPS 204)2,420-4,627 bytesFast operations; mature FIPS 204 ecosystemLarger signatures than Falcon
FalconFN-DSA (in progress)666-1,280 bytesSmallest signatures among selected PQ signaturesMore complex implementation and hardening
SPHINCS+SLH-DSA (FIPS 205)7,856-29,792 bytesConservative hash-based assumptionsVery large signatures and bandwidth/storage overhead

How to choose in practice

Heuristics for planning, not a substitute for protocol review, threat modeling, or a formal security audit.

  • Choose Dilithium (ML-DSA) when you want a standardized, general-purpose PQ signature and can accept multi-kilobyte signatures (about 2.4-4.6 KB). Dilithium is not small compared to classical schemes like Ed25519; it is the middle ground among these three NIST-selected families (smaller than SPHINCS+, larger than Falcon). Teams often start here because FIPS 204 is finalized, library and protocol support is among the strongest today, and implementation risk is generally considered lower than Falcon. That is why it is a common first migration choice, not because it has the smallest signatures.
  • Choose Falcon when signature size is a hard constraint and you will rely on a well-audited, constant-time implementation from a reputable library, not a from-scratch port. Falcon is still awaiting FIPS 206 finalization; treat ecosystem maturity as part of the decision.
  • Choose SPHINCS+ (SLH-DSA) when you explicitly want hash-only assumptions (FIPS 205) and signing volume is low enough that multi-kilobyte to tens-of-kilobyte signatures are acceptable. It is a niche choice today, not the default for high-volume services. Sometimes considered for root CAs, firmware, or code signing where signatures are infrequent and conservative assumptions matter more than bandwidth.

Operational impact checklist

Network

Larger signatures increase request/response sizes and can affect mobile and high-volume APIs.

Storage

At scale, signature bytes become a meaningful infrastructure cost driver.

Protocol fit

Verify compatibility with certificates, message formats, and legacy boundary systems.

Implementation risk

Prefer options your team can implement, test, and monitor confidently.

Sources

  • FIPS 204: Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard (ML-DSA / Dilithium)
  • FIPS 205: Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard (SLH-DSA / SPHINCS+)
  • NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Project
  • Open Quantum Safe (liboqs)